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Abstract: Recent decades have been marked by increasingly divided partisan opinion in the 
US. This study investigates whether a similar trend might be occurring in Canada. It does so 
by examining redistributive preferences, using Canadian Election Studies data from every 
election since 1992. Results suggest that Canada has experienced a surge in partisan sorting 
that is comparable to that in the US. Over time, likeminded citizens have increasingly 
clustered into parties, with increasingly stark divisions between partisans.  
 
Résumé : Aux États-Unis, les dernières décennies ont été marquées par des opinions 
partisanes de plus en plus divisées. Cette étude tente de savoir si une tendance similaire s'est 
développée au Canada. Pour ce faire, elle examine les préférences redistributives, utilisant les 
données de l’Étude électorale canadienne provenant de toutes les élections depuis 1992. Les 
résultats suggèrent que le Canada a connu une hausse de la sélection partisane qui est 
comparable à celle observée aux États-Unis. Au fil du temps, des citoyens aux vues similaires 
se sont regroupés dans des partis politiques, donnant lieu à des fossés grandissants entre les 
partisans. 
  2 
 
Numerous observers have noted increasing opinion polarization in the US. There is some 
debate as to whether polarization is occurring among partisans alone or among the population 
at large (see Abramowitz, 2010; Fiorina, 2013); but where partisans are concerned, the 
consensus question is “not whether, but how much?” (Fiorina and Abrams, 2008: 578). One 
of the key components of this process has been a surge in “partisan sorting”: that is, the 
extent to which likeminded citizens have increasingly clustered into different parties. Centrist 
Democrats and Republicans appear to have become more and more rare; and there seems to 
be less and less overlap between the two groups. This dynamic is observed not just in 
academic work — it is a regular feature of public discussion as well.  
Is Canada any different than its increasingly divided neighbour to the south? Despite 
common perceptions of a relatively liberal consensus, are there increasingly stark divisions 
between supporters of different Canadian parties? These questions are clearly relevant for 
scholars of Canadian politics, and they are of particular significance in the wake of Donald 
Trump’s election as US president. “Could Donald Trump happen here?” has become a 
frequent refrain in Canadian media outlets (for example, Gillis, 2016; Levitz, 2017), with the 
question particularly pertinent in light of the 2017 Conservative Party of Canada leadership 
race. And perhaps spurred by polls suggesting that just over three-quarters of Canadians 
would consider voting for a candidate with a Trump-like platform (Russell, 2016), several of 
the leadership candidates clearly attempted to take up that mantle: Kellie Leitch, who 
famously proposed a “Canadian values test” for potential immigrants, greeted Trump’s 
election as “an exciting message and one that we need delivered in Canada as well” (Graham, 
2016); while Kevin O’Leary, who led the pack in favourability polls before dropping out to 
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support his libertarian-leaning rival Maxime Bernier, is a reality TV star, business man, and 
political outsider that many likened to Trump (for example, Levitz, 2017). Given recent 
marked changes in party support, first in 2011, and then in 2015, yet another dramatic 
electoral shift seems firmly within the realm of the possible. Questions about the nature and 
extent of partisan polarization in Canada have therefore become especially relevant.  
The analyses that follow have important implications for the academic literature as 
well – a literature which is as-yet unclear about whether increased partisan sorting, 
particularly over the past ten years, has been a uniquely American phenomenon. Indeed, a 
small body of work on polarization in several European countries has suggested that US 
trends have not been reflected elsewhere – at least as of the early 2000s (for example, Adams 
et al., 2012a; Adams et al., 2012b). Canadian political institutions, including a multi-party 
system, may put it more in line with some European countries. But Canada’s cultural, 
political and economic proximity to the US, not to mention exposure to American media, 
make it a particularly interesting case. Indeed, there is some preliminary evidence, published 
in the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage, to suggest that partisan polarization has indeed been 
occurring in Canada (Johnston, 2014; discussed further below).  
Partisan sorting matters not just because it speaks to the nature of political preferences 
and the party system, but also because it has the potential to disconnect voters from policy-
makers (Hacker and Pierson, 2005; Kirkland, 2014). Scholars of Canadian politics have 
nevertheless paid relatively little attention to this topic. We suspect that this has been 
motivated in part by a Canadian perception – acurate or not – that American politics is more 
dysfunctional than Canadian politics. We also suspect that current concerns in Canada have 
been lessened somewhat by the election of the Liberals in 2015, which is particularly striking 
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when contrasted to the election of Donald Trump in 2016. Yet, as we show below, the 2015 
election results are not the product of reduced partisan divisions. This paper thus sets out to 
correct this misperception, partly as an exploration of the Canadian political landscape, but 
also as a test of the generalizability of a trend that has been so prominent in recent studies of 
the US. We aim, in short, to assess the extent to which Canada has experienced increased 
partisan sorting around policy preferences.  
We do so by focusing on preferences for redistributive policy. Our interest in policy 
preferences is driven in part by the recognition that public preferences play an important role 
in shaping policy outcomes, both generally and with regard to redistributive policy in 
particular (Brooks and Manza, 2007; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010), alongside recent work 
(discussed below) suggesting that partisan opinion polarization can be a complicating factor 
in this relationship. But redistribution is also a salient and long-standing policy domain with a 
relatively straightforward relationship to the left-right ideological spectrum. We intend for 
our results to speak both to the state of redistributive policy preferences and to the status of 
partisan sorting on policy issues more generally. 
We explore partisan sorting vis-à-vis policy preferences using data drawn from the 
new 2015 Canadian Election Study, alongside similar studies for every election back to 1992. 
We focus separately on (a) Canada outside of Quebec, and (b) Quebec, given the province’s 
distinct political cleavages and party system – with the pro-sovereigntist Bloc Québécois 
attracting a large proportion of votes since the early 1990s (for further discussion, see Nadeau 
and Bélanger, 2012). In doing so, we follow the established current practice in Canadian 
election studies (see, for example, Fournier et al., 2013; Medeiros and Noël, 2014). And we 
pay particular attention to the last two elections, each of which involved major changes in 
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party support, as we explore the relationship between Canadians’ redistributive preferences 
and party identification since the 1990s. 
Polarization South of the Border 
There is a burgeoning literature on polarization in the US, portraying politicians and party 
identifiers as increasingly divided in their positions and posturing. We would characterize 
this research field roughly as follows: Congressional Democrats have become more liberal 
while Republicans have become more conservative (see Fiorina and Abrams, 2008; Lee, 
2009; Poole, 2007); and this development, referred to in the literature as “elite polarization”, 
has pulled public policy away from the preferences of the general public (see McCarty et al., 
2006; Bonica et al., 2013).  
Underlying this argument about a growing disconnect between citizens and their 
representatives is the assumption that elite polarization has not been reflected in mass 
polarization (that is, across society as a whole). Indeed, for both Republican and Democratic 
representatives, elite polarization appears to be disconnected from the collective preferences 
of citizens, whether at the district- or the national-level (see, for example, Levendusky et al., 
2008; Bafumi and Herron, 2010). Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that polarization has 
taken place only among elites: while the citizenry as a whole might not be polarizing, there is 
an abundance of evidence to suggest that citizens who hold partisan attachments to the 
Democratic and Republican parties are becoming increasingly distinct (see, for example, 
Hetherington, 2009; Fiorina, 2013; Lelkes, 2016).   
The precise drivers of partisan polarization have been much debated. On the one 
hand, some scholars point to the impact that elite polarization may have on partisan 
preferences, with increasingly distinct party elites helping to create increasingly distinct 
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partisans (for example, Druckman et al., 2013; Zingher and Flynn, 2016). A key part of this 
top-down process has been a greater degree of mass partisanship (see Carmines et al., 2012; 
Lupu, 2015), driven by the easier partisan sorting of voters: distinct party positions make it 
simpler for (politically interested) citizens to figure out which party is closest to them, while 
at the same time making rival parties more unpalatable (Hetherington, 2001; Davis and 
Dunaway, 2016). This is reflected, for example, in studies suggesting that even independents, 
at least in their vote choice, have sorted more and more consistently over time (Smidt, 2015). 
Other scholars, however, have highlighted the possibility that existing partisans may 
simply have changed their preferences – perhaps even for reasons unconnected to elite 
polarization. While there is no consensus on the exact drivers of such a process, researchers 
have pointed to various explanatory factors, including: increased income inequality (Garand, 
2010); increasingly partisan media and media consumption habits, whether via television 
(Prior, 2013) or the internet (Lee et al., 2014); and mistaken beliefs about the extremism of 
political opponents (Ahler, 2014). As a consequence, partisan opinion polarization – that is, 
increasingly consistent preferences among party supporters and growing gaps between 
supporters of different parties – may in fact occur without any substantial changes in voters’ 
partisan allegiances.  
Note that these discussions are reflected in debates over how best to label these 
developments. Certain authors prefer the term “partisan sorting” rather than “partisan 
polarization” (for example, Abrams and Fiorina, 2016; Levendusky, 2009b), especially given 
that party supporters have not clustered around the poles (as implied by the term 
polarization). Yet even these authors tend to find a shift in partisan preferences away from 
the centre (for example, Levendusky, 2009b: 6). We can thus distinguish between two 
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separate but related processes: partisan sorting, wherein partisans correctly identify and align 
themselves with the party that best matches their preferences, thereby creating more uniform 
preference sets among a given party’s supporters; and partisan opinion polarization, wherein 
the preferences of partisans shift away from the centre (though not necessarily to the 
ideological extremes). In practice, however, evidence from the US suggests that these 
changes have typically gone hand in hand (see also Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009; Levendusky, 
2009a). 
In light of these developments, the literature suggests that alongside the growing 
disconnect between politicians and the public as a whole there is a closer connection between 
partisan identifiers’ parties and preferences. Researchers have found evidence of this on a 
wide range of issues, such as abortion (Adams, 1997), foreign policy (Shapiro and Bloch-
Elkon, 2007), the environment (McCright et al., 2014), and Israel (Cavari, 2013). And while 
this effect may be limited to “hot-button issues” (Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008), the 
attitudinal changes seem clear.  
These developments are interesting not only in and of themselves, but also for their 
consequences. At the societal level, some accounts suggest that partisan sorting and opinion 
polarization have fostered animosity that goes well beyond what one would expect on the 
basis of the actual extent of disagreement (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Mason, 2015); the 
result, as Mason puts it, is “a nation that may agree on many things, but is bitterly divided 
nonetheless” (2015: 142). At the political level, partisan polarization appears to negatively 
impact opinion representation (see, for example, Hacker and Pierson, 2005), with legislators 
less likely to represent median voter preferences when they represent electoral districts in 
which preferences are more polarized (see Kirkland, 2014). Add to these effects the
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importance of public opinion for government policy, and it becomes clear that partisan 
sorting and opinion polarization are important subjects of study outside of the US as well.  
Polarization in Canada 
Are these American developments reflected in Canada? The tendency in the literature 
comparing public opinion in Canada and the US has been to emphasize difference (for 
example, Lipset, 1990; Adams, 1998; 2003; though see Nevitte 1996 and Banting et al. 1997 
for exceptions to this rule). There is nevertheless a good deal of similarity on a wide range of 
attitudes on both sides of the border. Broadly cross-national work makes this clear, and recent 
research has found more similarity than difference on a range of attitudes, even those related 
to policies on which the two countries are thought to differ, such as healthcare (Nadeau et al., 
2014) and immigration (Harell et al., 2012).  
A similar conclusion can be drawn regarding the nature of partisanship in Canada and 
the US. Although much of the early scholarship on partisanship in Canada described it as far 
more unstable than American partisanship (for example, Elkin, 1978; LeDuc et al., 1984; 
though see also Sniderman et al., 1974), subsequent work has challenged the methodological 
underpinnings of that conclusion (see Johnston, 1992; Blais et al., 2001). Many authors have 
highlighted the importance of partisanship for vote choice (for example, Clarke and 
McCutcheon, 2009; Medeiros and Noël, 2014; Nevitte et al., 2000), suggesting that early 
contrasts with the US may have been exaggerated (for further discussion, see Anderson and 
Stephenson, 2010: 20-21). The extent to which Canadian partisans take information shortcuts 
from their parties is less well-established: the only evidence comes from two experimental 
studies conducted in the mid-2000s, which suggest that while cue taking does occur, it is 
limited to more politically sophisticated partisans and/or supporters of the NDP (Merolla et 
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al., 2008; 2016). Overall, however, existing research points to broad similarities in the nature 
of partisanship in the US and Canada. In a recent direct comparison of partisanship in these 
two countries by Bélanger and Stephenson, for example, the authors conclude that “holding a 
party identification in Canada has the same implications for developing partisan preferences 
in favour of one's own party and away from other parties as it does in the United States” 
(2014: 117).  
The literature on party polarization in Canada suggests further reasons to suspect 
similarities with the US. Despite the fact that Canadian parties have historically been 
ideologically incoherent (Clarke et al., 1996), recent decades have witnessed shifts in the 
party system that have increased the importance of ideology (see, for example, Carty et al., 
2000). Both party manifesto data and expert assessments of parties point toward meaningful 
and expanding ideological distances between parties, especially since the 1980s (Cochrane, 
2010; Klingemann et al., 2006). Within a comparative perspective, Kim et al., (2010)  
describe Canada as having a modestly polarized party system – though their analysis ends in 
the 1990s – while Dalton’s (2008) measure of polarization points to a trajectory of party 
polarization that broadly mirrors that in the US over the 1960-2011 period (see Han 2015, 
583). Moreover, these between-party differences appear to be reflected in the policy 
preferences of the various party memberships, with evidence of consistency within parties 
and substantial differences across them (Cross and Young, 2002).  
 Is this pattern also reflected in partisan opinion polarization? Most existing work on 
Canadian politics touches only tangentially on the issue: a variety of studies point to the 
existence of regional divisions in voting patterns and political preferences (Gidengil et al., 
1999; Ornstein and Stevenson, 1999; Anderson, 2010); Walks (2005) suggests that there is 
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additional low-level geographical polarization between city and suburban voters in Canada; 
Johnston (2008) concludes that party supporters are more polarized on the left-right scale 
outside of Quebec than in it; and Wesley (2009) finds evidence in Manitoba of polarized 
opinions on various issues, among both elites and party identifiers. Yet even in instances 
where research suggests opinion polarization (rather than simple cleavages), it neither tracks 
trends over time nor permits a comparison with other countries.  
There are a few, albeit limited, exceptions. Dragojlovic & Einsiedel (2014) compare 
public attitudes in the US and Canada, but they focus exclusively on opinions toward biofuels 
(finding less opinion polarization in Canada than the US). Pinard and Hamilton (1977) and 
Smiley (1978) find that the independence issue polarized opinion in Quebec in the 1960s and 
70s – but the contemporary relevance of this conclusion is questionable. Indeed, it is telling 
that the most suggestive study is based on survey data from over 30 years ago: comparing 
university undergraduates in the US and Canada, Gibbins and Nevitte (1985) conclude that 
Americans – regardless of whether or not they are party identifiers – are more polarized than 
their Canadian counterparts, while Anglophone Canadians are more polarized than 
Francophones. 
The most relevant recent test comes from preliminary work by Richard Johnston 
(2014), which suggests that trends in party polarization and partisan sorting in Canada may 
well reflect those in the US. Johnston’s (2014) work is to our knowledge the first systematic 
attempt to explore this dynamic in the Canadian context. Based on 11-point left/right 
placements, Johnston finds little evidence of widening gaps in the ideological positions of 
partisans since 2004. But the number of Conservative and NDP identifiers — parties on the 
right and left of the political spectrum — has increased. This marks a significant 
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development, leading Johnston to conclude that “Canadians’ ideological locations are 
probably better sorted by party than they were 30 years ago, especially on the right.” The end 
result is an electorate that, as in the US, appears to be more clearly divided across partisan 
lines.  
If this is indeed the case, Canada would stand apart from most other (non-US) cases. 
Studies looking at the Netherlands (Adams et al., 2012a) and the UK (Adams et al., 2012b) 
find that parties there have depolarized, that partisan sorting has decreased, and that the 
public on the whole is less polarized than before. Similar research on Germany finds that 
issue polarization has decreased within the German public (Munzert and Bauer, 2013). Yet 
only the last of these studies looks beyond the early 2000s (and none go beyond 2010), so it 
is impossible to say whether other countries simply lagged behind the US. An analysis of 
Canadian data up to 2015 thus offers both an additional case for study, and the ability to 
investigate more recent non-US trends.  
Methods 
Note that we focus here on partisan sorting, that is, the degree to which citizens’ attitudes on 
policy issues are clustered according to partisanship. This includes an investigation of sorting 
both across partisan identification and current vote choice, where the latter speaks to opinion 
trends that extend beyond those with strong, durable attachments to parties.  
We carry out this analysis using all Canadian Election Studies (CES) from 1992 to the 
present, including the new 2015 Canadian Election Study. We rely on a merged dataset, 
pulling together demographic, voting, and policy preference questions since 1992. 
Demographic and voting questions are of course relatively simple; merging policy questions 
is rather more complex, since question wording and/or response categories invariably change 
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in small (and sometimes large) ways over time. Analysis that follow rely on CES data exactly 
as they are distributed via the Canadian Opinion Research Archive; and a script to replicate 
recoding, merging and analysing the data is available at [redacted]. 
We focus in particular on trends in three questions on redistributive policy, selected in 
part because they are asked in very similar ways over the past several decades: 
Standard of Living (from the post-election Mail-back wave) 
The government should: See to it that everyone has a decent standard of living; 
Leave people to get ahead on their own; Not sure. 
Reduce the Gap (from the Post-Election telephone wave) 
How much do you think should be done to reduce the gap between the rich and the 
poor in Canada? Much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat 
less, or much less? 
Get Ahead (from the Post-Election telephone wave) 
Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree 
with the following statements?…People who don't get ahead should blame 
themselves, not the system. 
These questions are not exclusive to the CES — they have been used regularly in 
other surveys as well. They each capture somewhat different elements in support for 
redistributive policy; each also has some limitations for what we are trying to do here. 
Standard of Living is a measure of absolute preferences — that is, preferences that are not 
measured in relation to current policy levels. It is asked in a perfectly consistent way from 
1992 to 2011; it is however not a part of the 2015 survey, and so cannot speak to the most 
recent trends in partisan sorting. Reduce the Gap is in contrast a relative preference measure 
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— it asks about doing more than is currently done, and in so doing should shift due to 
movement in both (or either) the public’s preferred level of policy and actual policy levels. 
(For a discussion of absolute versus relative preferences, see Soroka and Wlezien, 2010.) It 
was asked consistently from 2000 to 2015; it was also asked in 1992 and 1997, though as a 
five-point agree-disagree question, so we combine the two five-point scales here. Get Ahead 
captures some combination of preferences for redistribution and attitudes towards the 
recipients of social assistance and unemployment. It is thus a less direct measure of 
redistributive preferences per se, though attitudes towards recipients may of course be an 
equally relevant a dimension of opinion polarization. Get Ahead is asked consistently from 
1997 to 2015. (It is asked before that, but not with the same five response categories.) 
These three measures of redistributive preferences are related, but also show a good 
deal of independent variance. Table 1 shows simple bivariate correlations between the 
measures across our entire sample.1 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
We do not combine these measures into an index below, but rather analyze each 
separately, looking at the extent to which variation can be explained by each of two measures 
of partisanship: respondents’ party identification; and respondents’ vote, where we use the 
actual vote drawn from the Post-Election Wave. Both partisanship and self-reported vote use 
identical wording throughout our analysis, respectively as follows: “in federal politics, do 
you usually think of yourself as a…”, with the major parties then listed alongside other/none; 
and “which party did you vote for?”, with options for the major parties as well as “other 
party”, “spoiled ballot”, and “don’t know”.  
In both cases, we allow the number of parties to vary from year to year, so that any 
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and all changes in the party system (including the appearance and/or disappearance of 
Reform, the Alliance, and the Green Party) are accurately reflected in our results. We include 
“Other/None” as a category in our estimates of the impact of party identification and vote; 
another option is to exclude these cases, but doing so makes no significant difference to the 
results. We also examine the relationship between each of our measures and respondents’ 
income tercile. This measure is based on more detailed income variables, but given that the 
response categories vary slightly from year to year, we use the distribution of income in each 
annual CES file to determine terciles. We include income mainly to provide a baseline with 
which to compare the impact of partisan variables. Given that income should matter to 
individuals’ preferences about redistribution, the degree to which partisanship matters more 
or less than income, and the extent to which that changes over time, may be a useful metric.  
Analysis 
We focus on a simple but telling analysis, with an eye on the degree to which preferences for 
redistribution are structured by respondents’ own income (that is, self-interest), partisanship, 
and time. We do so using Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs), which estimate, within each 
election study, the degree to which variation in each of our dependent variables is captured 
by (1) party identification, (2) vote, or (3) income tercile. ANOVAs are equivalent to OLS 
regression with categorical variables, where the only critical difference is in the reporting of 
results. We regard the omnibus test of partisanship in the ANOVA table as a major advantage 
here, in addition to the fact that ANOVA results provide information about how much 
variance is explained by each variable (categorical or otherwise). The other advantage of 
ANOVAs, rather than a simple comparison of mean redistributive preferences across parties, 
is that while the latter is straightforward in the two-party US system, it is less illuminating in 
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the shifting, multiparty Canadian system. ANOVAs offer a simple approach, with a single 
measure of overall variance explained by all parties (no matter how many there are).2 
Note that all our independent variables are included as categorical variables – 
necessary for party ID and vote, and useful for income since it allows us to relax the 
assumption that effects are linear. Note also that we do not include all three variables 
simultaneously, since we are not interested in the impact of each independent variable 
controlling for the others, but rather the degree to which variance in the dependent variables 
is related to party ID, vote, or income (even as these variables overlap). All results are 
included in the Appendix, where tables show the Partial Sum of Squares for each variable, 
alongside the degrees of freedom, an F-test of statistical significance, and the proportion of 
variance explained by each variable. 
In each case, the proportions of variance explained by the entire model make clear the 
degree to which variation in policy attitudes is related to party ID, vote, or income tercile. 
That said, there is one ANOVA for every combination of (a) a dependent variable (Standard 
of Living, Reduce the Gap, and Get Ahead), (b) an independent variable (party ID, vote, and 
income), and (c) an election year. Appendix results are thus difficult to sift through, but the 
critical findings are illustrated in Figures 1 through 3. In each case, the top row shows the 
trend in opinion over time, and the bottom row shows the proportion of within-year variance 
that is accounted for by party ID, vote, and income. Over-time trends in the bottom row give 
us a very clear sense of the extent to which there has been increasing partisan sorting over 
time. The left column shows results outside of Quebec, and the right show results in Quebec 
alone. 
Figure 1 presents results for the Standard of Living variable. The upper panels 
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indicate that support for government spending is higher in Quebec over the entire time 
period; an upward trend is more evident there than in the rest of Canada (ROC) as well. In 
both regions, however, there is clear majority support for a strong welfare state. (Of course, 
the figure offers information only about the mean, not the distribution around that mean. The 
latter changes relatively little given the use of variables with a limited number of response 
categories, however.) 
How do responses to the Standard of Living variable line up with partisanship, vote, 
and income over time? Note first that percentage of variance explained by any single measure 
never exceeds 10 per cent. There is of course a lot of individual-level variation not accounted 
for by these simple models; even so, where noisy survey data are concerned, explaining 10 
per cent of the variance with a single categorical variable is relatively striking. There is thus 
clear evidence in this and subsequent figures that Canadians’ attidues towards redistributive 
policy are at times powerfully affected by income and partisanship. 
How do income and partisanship compare?  Note in Figure 1 that at no point in time 
do income terciles account for more variance than the partisanship variables. Partisanship is 
related to income, of course, so it should capture at least some income-related variation, 
alongside variation in other drivers of partisanship as well. But the gap between income and 
partisanship seems here to be particularly wide, particularly for an attitude that we expect to 
be closely related to economic circumstance. On this general measure of support for the 
welfare state, it is clear that partisanship, measured either by identification or vote, matters 
more than income. 
Moreover, partisanship accounts for a growing proportion of variation in attitudes 
over time. There is some noise in year-to-year variation – the trend from 1992 to 2011 is not 
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a simple, straight line. Even so, by 2011 the relationship between Standard of Living and 
either vote or party ID is higher than in any previous year. This is clearest in the ROC; it is 
evident for vote in Quebec as well, though party ID there matters as much as in 1992 – the 
election in which the Bloc Québécois swept francophone ridings in the province.  
Are similar dynamics evident for Reduce the Gap and Get Ahead? For the most part, 
yes. Analysis of the Reduce the Gap variable in Figure 2 shows, again, somewhat higher 
support for the welfare state in Quebec vis-à-vis the ROC. It also suggests higher degrees of 
sorting – not just across partisan groups, but income groups as well – in 2015.  (Note that the 
jump in the impact of income in 2015 is absent in Figure 1 not because income does not 
matter to Standard of Living attitudes, but because we lack 2015 data for that variable.) The 
same is true of Get Ahead in Figure 3, though here the differences in overall levels of support 
are roughly similar in the ROC and Quebec. In this instance we note an even more dramatic 
increase in the importance of income in 2015 than with Reduce the Gap, as the largest overall 
difference is not party ID or vote, but income. There has been increased sorting on this 
question, to be sure; but the nature of that sorting points as much to income as to partisanship.  
Note also that, across the three questions, the percentage of variance explained by 
party ID tends to lag behind that explained by vote choice – although this trend is less clear in 
Quebec (with its added sovereigntist dimension in politics) than the ROC. It may be that 
polarization is reflected in voting decisions before generating party identifications. This 
would be in keeping with research suggesting that party polarization gives rise to more 
consistent ideological voting and a gradual expansion of partisan identities (see, for example, 
Dalton 2008; Lupu 2015). Evidence from the US, for examples, highlights that even voters 
with no self-declared partisan identity have become increasingly sorted in their voting 
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behaviour (Smidt 2015). Further research is of course required to determine whether this is in 
fact what is happening in Canada as well.  
Even so, over time and across various measures of redistributive preferences we note 
a broad increase in the proportion of variance explained by party ID and vote choice. This 
suggests growing partisan sorting; likeminded citizens have increasingly clustered into 
parties. Before 2015, this trend pointed to a growing divergence between the proportion of 
variance explained by partisanship variables. 2015 saw a sharp increase in the importance of 
income as well, however. Redistributive preferences appear to be more closely aligned with 
economic self-interest than in the past, though it is unclear whether 2015 will serve in this 
regard as a watershed moment or an outlier. Either way, the general trend in the data is clear: 
redistributive preferences in Canada are increasingly divided across both economic and 
partisan lines.  
Discussion 
This paper has used data from Canadian Election Studies to examine trends in partisan 
sorting of redistributive preferences from 1992 to 2015. Results suggest that Canada has 
experienced a surge in partisan sorting; indeed, one that may be comparable to what has been 
identified in the US. This is marginally more true when we look at partisans by vote rather 
than party ID – it may be that changes in political parties are reflected in voting decisions 
before they are consolidated into party identifications. Regardless, the overall trend is clear. 
 We readily acknowledge that there is plenty of work left to do. This study offers only 
a starting point for analyses of both redistributive preferences and partisan polarization. Our 
intention here has not been to offer a definitive account. Rather, our aim has been to trace 
out, for what to our knowledge is the first time, trends in partisan attitudes up to the most 
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recent election. ANOVAs offer only a partial glimpse of what is happening in Canadian 
politics. But our sense is that this glimpse is at odds with what some might believe. And our 
results point towards the importance of further work, modeling redistributive preferences 
more completely, and accounting more fully for what we have shown is an increasing 
importance of partisanship, and income, over time.  
 A few caveats are in order. First, we have looked here only at partisan sorting vis-à-
vis attitudes about redistribution. We regard redistribution as a central, salient policy domain, 
of course, but increased partisan sorting on this issue will most powerfuly condition Canadian 
electoral politics only if it is correlated with sorting on other policy preferences. If other 
policy preferences matter to voting behavior, and pull voters in various directions, sorting on 
redistributive preference may matter only a little. This is one area for further research.   
Another is an effort to explore the relationship between the two (interrelated) 
phenomena of partisan polarization and sorting. Our findings suggest that, over the last 
several elections, party ID and vote choice have come to explain a growing amount of 
variance in redistributive preferences. That these political factors have often mattered more 
than pure self-interest (that is, income) is striking. Yet our present study does not allow us to 
examine partisan polarization directly. There are strong a priori reasons to believe that a 
combination of elite polarization and partisan sorting is a recipe for (at least modest) partisan 
polarization, as has been the case in the US (see, for example, Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009; 
Levendusky, 2009a) – yet further analysis is nevertheless needed to sort out these effects. 
Panel data would provide one potential way forward, but the most recent CES panel data only 
covers the 2004-2008 period, thus preceding recent trends. Original survey data collection 
could therefore be especially fruitful for this question.  
  20 
In the meantime, we note that our findings have interesting implications for students 
of Canadian politics. Party competition in Canada has historically been characterized not by 
competition between left(/labour)- and right-oriented parties, but rather by strong, 
ideologically-flexible centrist parties (and mostly, just one party), put in power by broad-
based regional coalitions (see Johnston, 1988; Carty et al., 2000). Yet the party system has 
been marked by increased polarization since the 1980s (see, for example, Cochrane, 2010), 
and our analysis offers support for the conjecture that Canadian parties are currently more 
effective at capturing (and perhaps enhancing) ideological divisions in society. It also serves 
as a useful reminder that the 2015 election was not the product of Canadians coming together 
in their support for redistribution, bur rather the electoral success of a pro-redistribution 
plurality. Whether this distribution of preferences, and the way in which it is captured by the 
party system, would withstand increasingly polarized and/or populist elite politics remains to 
be seen. For now, this much is clear: increased partisan sorting, at least regarding attitudes 
about redistribution, is readily evident in Canada. 
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Notes 
                                               
1 Note the number of cases varies across correlations, based on missing cases, as well as the 
fact that Standard of Living is in the mailback wave of the CES. Note also that we rely on 
unweighted data for all analyses. The decision to not weight was based on the following 
considerations. Although there are weights in CES releases, they are designed for the 
campaign wave, not the much-reduced post-election wave in which two of our questions are 
asked; they are also not designed for separate Quebec and ROC samples. Our focus is also 
less on the absolute levels of support for each question than it is on differences in the 
variance explained by measures of partisanship and income, and preliminary tests (with the 
most recent CES) suggest that these estimates change little with weighting by gender and age. 
2 One possible limitation of ANOVA results in this instance is that they will be partly 
conditioned by overall variance in the dependent variable, which may change over time. 
Thankfully, in the data we analyse here there is relatively little over-time change in the 
variance of the dependent variables. Indeed, to the extent that there is over-time change in 
variance in some measures, it appears to decrease slightly, which would mute rather than 
augment the impact of our independent variables over time. Annual standard deviations in 
Standard of Living remain between .40 and .43 in the ROC, and decrease steadily from .40 to 
.30 in Quebec; standard deviations in Reduce the Gap decline from .30 to .22 in the ROC, 
and from .26 to .21 in Quebec; standard deviations in Get Ahead remain between .31 and 33 
in the ROC, and between .30 and .32 in Quebec. 
  22 
Bibliography 
Abramowitz, Alan I. 2010. The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, 
Polarization, and American Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Abrams, Samuel J, and Morris P Fiorina. 2016. “Party Sorting: The Foundations of 
Polarized Politics.” In American Gridlock: The Sources, Character, and Impact of 
Political Polarization, eds. James A. Thurber and Antoine Yoshinaka. New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Adams, James, Jane Green, and Caitlin Milazzo. 2012a. “Has the British Public 
Depolarized Along with Political Elites? An American Perspective on British 
Public Opinion.” Comparative Political Studies 45: 507-30. 
Adams, James, Catherine E. De Vries, and Debra Leiter. 2012b. “Subconstituency 
Reactions to Elite Depolarization in the Netherlands: An Analysis of the Dutch 
Public's Policy Beliefs and Partisan Loyalties, 1986–98.” British Journal of 
Political Science 42: 81-105. 
 Adams, Greg D. 1997. “Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution.” American 
Journal of Political Science 41(3): 718-37. 
Adams, Michael. 1998. Sex in the Snow: Canadian Social Values at the End of the 
Millenium. Toronto: Penguin.  
Adams, Michael. 2003. Fire and Ice: The United States, Canada, and the Myth of 
Converging Values. Toronto: Penguin. 
Ahler, Douglas J. 2014. “Self-Fulfilling Misperceptions of Public Polarization.” The 
Journal of Politics 76(3): 607-620. 
Anderson, Cameron. 2010. “Regional Heterogeneity and Policy Preferences in 
  23 
Canada: 1979–2006.” Regional & Federal Studies 20(4-5): 447-68. 
Anderson, Cameron D, and Laura B Stephenson.  2010.  "The Puzzle of Elections and 
Voting in Canada."  In Voting Behaviour in Canada, eds.  Cameron D Anderson 
and Laura B Stephenson.  Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press.   
Bafumi, Joseph and Michael C Herron. 2010. “Leapfrog Representation and 
Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress.” 
American Political Science Review 104(3): 519-42.Bafumi, Joseph and Robert Y. 
Shapiro. 2009. “A New Partisan Voter.” The Journal of Politics 71(1): 1-24. 
Baldassarri, Delia, and Andrew Gelman. 2008. “Partisans without Constraint: 
Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion.” American Journal 
of Sociology 114(2): 408-46. 
 Banting, Keith, George Hoberg and Richard Simeon, eds. Degrees of Freedom: 
Canada and the United States in a Changing World. 1997. Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press. 
Bélanger, Éric, and Laura B Stephenson.  2014.  "The Comparative Study of 
Canadian Voting Behaviour."  In Comparing Canada: Methods and Perspectives 
on Canadian Politics, eds.  Luc Turgeon, Martin  Papillon, Jennifer Wallner and 
Stephen White.  Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press.  97-122. 
Blais, André, Elisabeth Gidengil, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte.  2001.  
"Measuring Party Identification: Britain, Canada, and the United States."  Political 
Behavior 23: 5-22. 
Bonica, Adam, Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2013. “Why 
Hasn't Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?”. The Journal of Economic 
  24 
Perspectives 27: 103-23.  
Brooks, Clem and Jeff Manza. 2007. Why Welfare States Persist: The Importance of 
Public Opinion in Democracies. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Carmines, Edward G., Michael J. Ensley and Michael W. Wagner. 2012. “Who Fits 
the Left-Right Divide? Partisan Polarization in the American Electorate.” 
American Behavioral Scientist 56(2): 1631-53. 
Carty, R. Kenneth, William Cross and Lisa Young. 2000. Rebuilding Canadian Party 
Politics. Vancouver: UBC Press. 
Carty, R Kenneth, William Cross, and Lisa Young.  2007.  Rebuilding Canadian 
Party Politics.  Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press. 
Cavari, Amnon. 2013. “Religious Beliefs, Elite Polarization, and Public Opinion on 
Foreign Policy: The Partisan Gap in American Public Opinion toward Israel.” 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research 25(1): 1-22. 
Clarke, Harold D, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc, and Jon H Pammett.  1996.  Absent 
Mandate: Canadian Electoral Politics in an Era of Restructuring.  Vancouver, 
BC: Gage. 
Clarke, Harold D, and Allan L McCutcheon.  2009.  "The Dynamics of Party 
Identification Reconsidered."  Public Opinion Quarterly 73: 704-28. 
Cochrane, Christopher.  2010.  "Left/Right Ideology and Canadian Politics."  
Canadian Journal of Political Science 43: 583-605. 
Cross, William, and Lisa Young.  2002.  "Policy Attitudes of Party Members in 
Canada: Evidence of Ideological Politics."  Canadian Journal of Political 
Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 35: 859-80. 
  25 
Dalton, Russell J.  2008.  "The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems: Party 
System Polarization, Its Measurement, and Its Consequences."  Comparative 
Political Studies 41: 899-920. 
Davis, Nicholas T, and Johanna L Dunaway. 2016. “Party Polarization, Media 
Choice, and Mass Partisan-Ideological Sorting.” Public Opinion Quarterly 
80(S1): 272-97. 
Dragojlovic, Nick, and Edna Einsiedel. 2014. “The Polarization of Public Opinion on 
Biofuels in North America: Key Drivers and Future Trends.” Biofuels 5(3): 233-
47.  
Druckman, James N., Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus. 2013. “How Elite Partisan 
Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation.” American Political Science 
Review 107(1): 57-79. 
Elkins, David J.  1978.  "Party Identification: A Conceptual Analysis."  Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 11: 419-36. 
Fiorina, Morris P. 2013. “Party Homogeneity and Contentious Politics.” In Can We 
Talk? The Rise of Rude, Nasty, Stubborn Politics, eds. Daniel M. Shea and Morris 
P Fiorina. New York: Pearson. 142-53. 
Fiorina, Morris P. and Samuel J Abrams. 2009. Disconnect: The Breakdown of 
Representation in American Politics. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 
Fiorina, Morris P. and Samuel J Abrams. 2008. “Political Polarization in the 
American Public.” Annual Review of Political Science 11(1): 563-88. 
Fournier, Patrick, Fred Cutler, Stuart Soroka, Dietlind Stolle, and Éric Bélanger.  
2013.  "Riding the Orange Wave: Leadership, Values, Issues, and the 2011 
  26 
Canadian Election."  Canadian Journal of Political Science 46: 863-97. 
Garand, James C. 2010. “Income Inequality, Party Polarization, and Roll-Call Voting 
in the U.S. Senate.” The Journal of Politics 72: 1109-28.  
Gibbins, Roger, and Neil Nevitte. 1985. “Canadian Political Ideology: A Comparative 
Analysis.” Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science 
politique 18(3): 577-98.  
Gidengil, Elisabeth, André Blais, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte. 1999. “Making 
Sense of Regional Voting in the 1997 Canadian Federal Election: Liberal and 
Reform Support Outside Quebec.” Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue 
canadienne de science politique 32(2): 247-72. 
Gillis, Charlie.  2016.  “Donald Trump could happen in Canada. It’s already begun.” 
Maclean’s: http://www.macleans.ca/politics/donald-trump-could-happen-in-
canada-its-already-begun/ (February 5, 2017). 
Graham, Jennifer.  2016.  “Tories talk immigration, economy, environment, trade at 
leadership debate.”  CTV News: http://saskatoon.ctvnews.ca/tories-talk-
immigration-economy-environment-trade-at-leadership-debate-1.3153194 
(February 5, 2017). 
Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. 2005. “Abandoning the Middle: The Bush Tax 
Cuts and the Limits of Democratic Control.” Perspectives on Politics 3(1): 33-53. 
Han, Sung Min.  2015.  "Income Inequality, Electoral Systems and Party 
Polarisation."  European Journal of Political Research 54: 582-600. 
Harbridge, Laruel, Neil Malhotra and Brian F. Harrison. 2014. “Public Preferences 
for Bipartisanship in the Policymaking Process.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 
  27 
39(3): 327-355. 
Harell, Allison, Stuart Soroka, Shanto Iyengar and Nicholas Valentino. 2012. “The 
Impact of Economic and Cultural Cues on Support for Immigration in Canada and 
the US.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 45(3): 499-530. 
Hetherington, Marc J. 2001. “Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite 
Polarization.” American Political Science Review 95(3): 619-31. 
Hetherington, Marc J. 2009. “Review Article: Putting Polarization in Perspective.” 
British Journal of Political Science 39(2): 413-48. 
Iyengar, Shanto, and Sean J. Westwood. 2015. “Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: 
New Evidence on Group Polarization.” American Journal of Political Science 59: 
690-707. 
Johnston, Richard. 1988. “The Ideological Structure of Opinion on Policy.” In Party 
Democracy in Canada: The Political of National Party Conventions, ed. George 
Perlin. Scarborough: Prentice Hall. 
Johnston, Richard.  1992.  "Party Identification Measures in the Anglo-American 
Democracies: A National Survey Experiment."  American Journal of Political 
Science: 542-59. 
Johnston, Richard. 2008. “Polarized Pluralism in the Canadian Party System: 
Presidential Address to the Canadian Political Science Association, June 5, 2008.” 
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 
41(4): 815-34.  
Johnston, Richard. 2014. “Canada Is Polarizing – and It’s Because of the Parties.” The 
Monkey Cage: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-
  28 
cage/wp/2014/02/18/canada-is-polarizing-and-its-because-of-the-parties/ 
(September 1, 2016). 
Kim, HeeMin, G Bingham Powell Jr, and Richard C Fording.  2010.  "Electoral 
Systems, Party Systems, and Ideological Representation: An Analysis of 
Distortion in Western Democracies."  Comparative Politics 42: 167-85. 
Kirkland, Justin H. 2014. “Ideological Heterogeneity and Legislative Polarization in 
the United States.” Political Research Quarterly 67(3): 533-46. 
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Andrea Volkens, Judith  Bara, Ian Budge , and Michael D. 
McDonald.  2006.  Mapping Policy Preferences Ii: Estimates for Parties, 
Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union, and Oecd 1990-
2003.  Vol. 2.  Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
LeDuc, Lawrence, Harold D Clarke, Jane Jenson, and Jon H Pammett.  1984.  
"Partisan Instability in Canada: Evidence from a New Panel Study."  American 
Political Science Review 78: 470-84. 
Lee, Frances E. 2009. Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles and Partisanship in the 
U.S. Senate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lee, Jae Kook, Jihyang Choi, Cheonsoo Kim, and Yonghwan Kim. 2014. “Social 
Media, Network Heterogeneity, and Opinion Polarization.” Journal of 
Communication 64(4): 702-22. 
Lelkes, Yphtach. 2016. “Mass Polarization: Manifestations and Measurements.” 
Public Opinion Quarterly 80(S1): 392-410. 
Levendusky, Matthew S. 2009a. “The Microfoundations of Mass Polarization.” 
Political Analysis 17(2): 162-76.  
  29 
Levendusky, Matthew. 2009b. The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats 
and Conservatives Became Republicans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Levendusky, Matthew S., Jeremy C. Pope and Simon D. Jackman. 2008. “Measuring 
District-Level Partisanship with Implications for the Analysis of US Elections.” 
The Journal of Politics 70(3): 736-53. 
Levitz, Stephanie.  2017.  “Could Trump-style populism happen here in Canada?”  
The Toronto Star: https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/02/05/could-trump-
style-populism-happen-here-in-canada.html (February 5, 2017). 
Lipset, Seymour M. 1990. Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the 
United States and Canada. New York: Routledge. 
Lupu, Naom. 2015. “Party Polarization and Mass Partisanship: A Comparative 
Perspective.” Political Behavior 37(2): 331-56. 
Mason, Lilliana. 2015. ““I Disrespectfully Agree”: The Differential Effects of 
Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Polarization.” American Journal of Political 
Science 59: 128–45. 
McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. Polarized America: 
The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
McCright, Aaron M., Chenyuang Xiao and Riley E. Dunlap. 2014. “Political 
polarization on support for government spending on environmental protection in 
the USA, 1974–2012.” Social Science Research 48(1): 251-60. 
Medeiros, Mike, and Alain Noël.  2014.  "The Forgotten Side of Partisanship: 
Negative Party Identification in Four Anglo-American Democracies."  
Comparative Political Studies 47: 1022-46. 
  30 
Merolla, Jennifer L, Laura B Stephenson, and Elizabeth J Zechmeister.  2008.  "Can 
Canadians Take a Hint? The (in) Effectiveness of Party Labels as Information 
Shortcuts in Canada."  Canadian Journal of Political Science 41: 673-96. 
Merolla, Jennifer L, Laura B Stephenson, and Elizabeth J Zechmeister.  2016.  
"Deciding Correctly: Variance in the Effective Use of Party Cues."  In Voting 
Experiments, eds.  André Blais, Jean-François  Laslier and Karine Van der 
Straeten.  Heidelberg, Germany: Springer International Publishing. 
Munzert, Simon, and Paul C. Bauer. 2013. “Political Depolarization in German Public 
Opinion, 1980–2010.” Political Science Research and Methods 1(1): 67-89. 
Nadeau, Richard, and Éric Bélanger.  2012.  "Quebec Versus the Rest of Canada, 
1965-2006."  In The Canadian Election Studies: Assessing Four Decades of 
Influence, eds.  Mebs Kanji, Antoine Bilodeau and Thomas J Scotto.  Vancouver, 
BC: UBC Press.   
Nadeau, Richard, Éric Bélanger, François Pétry, Stuart N Soroka, and Antonia 
Maioni. 2015. Health Care Policy and Opinion in the United States and Canada. 
New York, NY: Routledge. 
Nevitte, Neil. 1996. The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-
National Perspective. Peterborough: Broadview Press. 
Nevitte, Neil, André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Richard Nadeau.  2000.  Unsteady 
State: The 1997 Canadian Federal Election.  Don Mills, ON: Oxford University 
Press. 
Ornstein, Michael, and H. Michael Stevenson. 1999. Politics and Ideology in 
Canada: Elite and Public Opinion in the Transformation of the Welfare State. 
  31 
Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press. 
Pinard, Maurice, and Richard Hamilton. 1977. “The Independence Issue and the 
Polarization of the Electorate: The 1973 Quebec Election.” Canadian Journal of 
Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 10(2): 215-60. 
 Prior, Markus. 2013. “Media and Political Polarization.” Annual Review of Political 
Science 16: 101-27. 
 Poole, Keith T. 2007. “Changing Minds? Not in Congress!”. Public Choice 131(3-4): 
435-51. 
Russell, Andrew.  2016.  “Canadians would consider voting for Donald Trump-like 
candidate: Ipsos poll.”  Global News: 
http://globalnews.ca/news/3051240/canadians-would-consider-voting-for-donald-
trump-like-candidate-poll/ (February 5, 2017). 
Shapiro, Robert Y. and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon. 2007. “Ideological Partisanship and 
American Public Opinion toward Foreign Policy.” In Power and Superpower: 
Leadership and Exceptionalism in the 21st Century, eds. Morton H. Halperin, 
Jeffrey Laurenti, Peter Rundlet and Spencer P. Boyer. Washington: The Century 
Foundation and Center for American Progress. 
Smidt, Corwin D. 2015. “Polarization and the Decline of the American Floating 
Voter.” American Journal of Political Science Forthcoming: 1-17. 
Smiley, Donald. 1978. “The Canadian Federation and the Challenge of Quebec 
Independence.” Publius 8(1): 199-224.  
Sniderman, Paul M, Hugh D Forbes, and Ian Melzer.  1974.  "Party Loyalty and 
Electoral Volatility: A Study of the Canadian Party System."  Canadian Journal 
  32 
of Political Science 7: 268-88. 
Soroka, Stuart N. and Christopher Wlezien. 2010. Degrees of Democracy: Politics, 
Public Opinion, and Policy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Walks, R. Alan. 2005. “The City-Suburban Cleavage in Canadian Federal Politics.” 
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 
38(2): 383-413. 
Wesley, Jared J. 2009. “In Search of Brokerage and Responsibility: Party Politics in 
Manitoba.” Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science 
politique 42(1): 211-36.  
Zingher, Joshua N., and Michael E. Flynn. 2016. “From on High: The Effect of Elite 
Polarization on Mass Attitudes and Behaviors, 1972–2012.” British Journal of 
Political Science Forthcoming: 1-23. 
 
  
  33 
Figure 1. Standard of Living, Over Time 
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Figure 2. Reduce the Gap, Over Time 
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Figure 3. Get Ahead, Over Time 
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Table 1. Bivariate Correlations between Measures of Redistributive Preferences 
 
 Reduce the Gap Get Ahead 
Standard of Living .34 (N=11,618)) 
-.24 
(N=9,420) 
Get Ahead -.20 (N=19,296)  
Based on unweighted data, 1992-2015, all provinces combined. 
All correlations are significant at p < .01. 
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Appendix Table 1: ANOVA Results, by year, for each DV-IV combination 
Dependent Variable Region Independent Variable Election    ANOVA Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F) 
Standard of Living ROC Party ID 1992 Party ID 4 17.276 4.319 23.682 0.000 
    Residuals 1707 311.317 0.182   
   1997 Party ID 4 10.007 2.502 13.651 0.000 
    Residuals 1274 233.478 0.183   
   2000 Party ID 4 12.133 3.033 17.867 0.000 
    Residuals 979 166.204 0.170   
   2004 Party ID 4 9.949 2.487 13.787 0.000 
    Residuals 1239 223.526 0.180   
   2006 Party ID 4 9.418 2.355 13.228 0.000 
    Residuals 901 160.368 0.178   
   2008 Party ID 4 10.784 2.696 18.639 0.000 
    Residuals 864 124.968 0.145   
   2011 Party ID 4 17.703 4.426 30.718 0.000 
    Residuals 1129 162.668 0.144   
Standard of Living ROC Vote 1992 Vote 4 21.725 5.431 30.495 0.000 
    Residuals 1470 261.811 0.178   
   1997 Vote 4 11.224 2.806 15.196 0.000 
    Residuals 1075 198.507 0.185   
   2000 Vote 3 2.826 0.942 6.365 0.000 
    Residuals 572 84.653 0.148   
   2004 Vote 4 3.427 0.857 5.511 0.000 
    Residuals 649 100.893 0.155   
   2006 Vote 4 7.303 1.826 10.061 0.000 
    Residuals 731 132.663 0.181   
   2008 Vote 4 14.515 3.629 23.185 0.000 
    Residuals 1275 199.554 0.157   
   2011 Vote 4 17.715 4.429 30.539 0.000 
    Residuals 1025 148.641 0.145   
Standard of Living ROC Income 1992 Income 2 3.398 1.699 8.941 0.000 
    Residuals 430 81.697 0.190   
   1997 Income 2 2.466 1.233 6.508 0.002 
    Residuals 1018 192.917 0.190   
   2000 Income 2 2.790 1.395 7.807 0.000 
    Residuals 745 133.131 0.179   
   2004 Income 2 3.000 1.500 8.106 0.000 
    Residuals 1315 243.335 0.185   
   2006 Income 2 1.508 0.754 4.077 0.017 
    Residuals 866 160.163 0.185   
   2008 Income 2 1.624 0.812 5.552 0.004 
    Residuals 640 93.574 0.146   
   2011 Income 2 1.553 0.777 4.993 0.007 
    Residuals 797 123.947 0.156   
Standard of Living QC Party ID 1992 Party ID 4 1.933 0.483 3.087 0.016 
    Residuals 291 45.567 0.157   
   1997 Party ID 4 1.569 0.392 2.697 0.030 
    Residuals 418 60.782 0.145   
   2000 Party ID 5 0.327 0.065 0.574 0.720 
    Residuals 407 46.391 0.114   
   2004 Party ID 4 0.543 0.136 1.066 0.373 
    Residuals 319 40.650 0.127   
   2006 Party ID 5 0.262 0.052 0.433 0.825 
    Residuals 232 28.038 0.121   
   2008 Party ID 5 1.028 0.206 2.054 0.072 
    Residuals 268 26.813 0.100   
   2011 Party ID 5 1.673 0.335 3.724 0.003 
    Residuals 349 31.366 0.090   
Standard of Living QC Vote 1992 Vote 4 2.430 0.608 3.733 0.006 
    Residuals 258 41.988 0.163   
   1997 Vote 4 1.728 0.432 2.863 0.023 
    Residuals 371 55.979 0.151   
   2000 Vote 4 0.648 0.162 1.477 0.209 
    Residuals 323 35.422 0.110   
   2004 Vote 4 0.894 0.223 2.018 0.093 
    Residuals 242 26.801 0.111   
  38 
   2006 Vote 5 1.074 0.215 1.621 0.156 
    Residuals 193 25.562 0.132   
   2008 Vote 5 1.577 0.315 3.000 0.012 
    Residuals 319 33.535 0.105   
   2011 Vote 4 1.156 0.289 2.873 0.024 
    Residuals 230 23.132 0.101   
Standard of Living QC Income 1992 Income 2 0.934 0.467 2.822 0.061 
    Residuals 259 42.864 0.165   
   1997 Income 2 0.168 0.084 0.553 0.575 
    Residuals 358 54.478 0.152   
   2000 Income 2 0.256 0.128 1.213 0.299 
    Residuals 374 39.526 0.106   
   2004 Income 2 0.360 0.180 1.420 0.243 
    Residuals 338 42.809 0.127   
   2006 Income 2 0.711 0.355 2.973 0.053 
    Residuals 229 27.383 0.120   
   2008 Income 2 0.234 0.117 1.058 0.349 
    Residuals 180 19.884 0.110   
   2011 Income 2 0.011 0.005 0.063 0.939 
    Residuals 292 25.337 0.087   
Reduce the Gap ROC Party ID 1992 Party ID 4 6.987 1.747 21.880 0.000 
    Residuals 1671 133.403 0.080   
   1997 Party ID 4 4.752 1.188 12.780 0.000 
    Residuals 1245 115.727 0.093   
   2000 Party ID 4 7.569 1.892 32.308 0.000 
    Residuals 2179 127.626 0.059   
   2004 Party ID 4 5.439 1.360 23.198 0.000 
    Residuals 2993 175.444 0.059   
   2006 Party ID 4 3.910 0.977 17.507 0.000 
    Residuals 1464 81.743 0.056   
   2008 Party ID 4 3.920 0.980 18.954 0.000 
    Residuals 1708 88.317 0.052   
   2011 Party ID 4 9.974 2.494 49.188 0.000 
    Residuals 2296 116.394 0.051   
   2015 Party ID 4 12.528 3.132 69.575 0.000 
    Residuals 2245 101.058 0.045   
Reduce the Gap ROC Vote 1992 Vote 4 7.275 1.819 22.826 0.000 
    Residuals 1447 115.298 0.080   
   1997 Vote 4 6.315 1.579 17.449 0.000 
    Residuals 1047 94.726 0.090   
   2000 Vote 3 1.917 0.639 11.785 0.000 
    Residuals 930 50.413 0.054   
   2004 Vote 4 1.960 0.490 9.609 0.000 
    Residuals 1130 57.607 0.051   
   2006 Vote 4 2.108 0.527 9.180 0.000 
    Residuals 1125 64.592 0.057   
   2008 Vote 4 6.597 1.649 32.544 0.000 
    Residuals 2181 110.535 0.051   
   2011 Vote 4 10.583 2.646 52.559 0.000 
    Residuals 1972 99.268 0.050   
   2015 Vote 4 10.240 2.560 58.341 0.000 
    Residuals 2016 88.460 0.044   
Reduce the Gap ROC Income 1992 Income 2 2.548 1.274 17.145 0.000 
    Residuals 428 31.800 0.074   
   1997 Income 2 4.302 2.151 23.907 0.000 
    Residuals 997 89.700 0.090   
   2000 Income 2 2.349 1.175 19.223 0.000 
    Residuals 1502 91.772 0.061   
   2004 Income 2 5.552 2.776 48.017 0.000 
    Residuals 3257 188.306 0.058   
   2006 Income 2 2.412 1.206 21.038 0.000 
    Residuals 1379 79.046 0.057   
   2008 Income 2 1.167 0.584 11.085 0.000 
    Residuals 1180 62.117 0.053   
   2011 Income 2 0.512 0.256 5.156 0.006 
    Residuals 1537 76.357 0.050   
   2015 Vote 4 10.240 2.560 58.341 0.000 
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    Residuals 2016 88.460 0.044   
Reduce the Gap QC Party ID 1992 Party ID 4 0.830 0.207 2.955 0.020 
    Residuals 283 19.862 0.070   
   1997 Party ID 4 0.739 0.185 2.680 0.031 
    Residuals 413 28.482 0.069   
   2000 Party ID 5 1.616 0.323 8.300 0.000 
    Residuals 1107 43.098 0.039   
   2004 Party ID 5 0.824 0.165 3.401 0.005 
    Residuals 962 46.614 0.048   
   2006 Party ID 5 1.404 0.281 5.580 0.000 
    Residuals 407 20.476 0.050   
   2008 Party ID 5 0.927 0.185 4.416 0.001 
    Residuals 569 23.877 0.042   
   2011 Party ID 5 2.290 0.458 10.087 0.000 
    Residuals 860 39.050 0.045   
   2015 Party ID 5 2.265 0.453 11.228 0.000 
    Residuals 488 19.687 0.040   
Reduce the Gap QC Vote 1992 Vote 4 1.451 0.363 5.301 0.000 
    Residuals 253 17.318 0.068   
   1997 Vote 4 0.684 0.171 2.503 0.042 
    Residuals 368 25.150 0.068   
   2000 Vote 4 1.039 0.260 6.994 0.000 
    Residuals 613 22.774 0.037   
   2004 Vote 4 0.898 0.225 4.607 0.001 
    Residuals 444 21.646 0.049   
   2006 Vote 5 0.960 0.192 3.728 0.003 
    Residuals 315 16.221 0.051   
   2008 Vote 5 1.900 0.380 8.869 0.000 
    Residuals 641 27.457 0.043   
   2011 Vote 4 0.952 0.238 5.232 0.000 
    Residuals 559 25.418 0.045   
   2015 Vote 5 1.470 0.294 7.001 0.000 
    Residuals 457 19.196 0.042   
Reduce the Gap QC Income 1992 Income 2 0.606 0.303 4.619 0.011 
    Residuals 252 16.524 0.066   
   1997 Income 2 1.153 0.576 8.756 0.000 
    Residuals 355 23.372 0.066   
   2000 Income 2 0.470 0.235 5.989 0.003 
    Residuals 971 38.078 0.039   
   2004 Income 2 0.516 0.258 5.223 0.006 
    Residuals 1042 51.433 0.049   
   2006 Income 2 0.120 0.060 1.125 0.326 
    Residuals 397 21.082 0.053   
   2008 Income 2 0.139 0.069 1.557 0.212 
    Residuals 368 16.372 0.044   
   2011 Income 2 0.039 0.020 0.458 0.633 
    Residuals 397 17.092 0.043   
   2015 Vote 5 1.470 0.294 7.001 0.000 
    Residuals 457 19.196 0.042   
Get Ahead ROC Party ID 1997 Party ID 4 7.658 1.914 19.697 0.000 
    Residuals 2146 208.569 0.097   
   2000 Party ID 4 5.455 1.364 14.558 0.000 
    Residuals 1772 165.979 0.094   
   2004 Party ID 4 7.081 1.770 17.243 0.000 
    Residuals 2284 234.484 0.103   
   2006 Party ID 4 8.171 2.043 21.572 0.000 
    Residuals 2277 215.621 0.095   
   2008 Party ID 4 4.834 1.209 12.605 0.000 
    Residuals 1698 162.798 0.096   
   2011 Party ID 4 12.872 3.218 36.343 0.000 
    Residuals 2287 202.497 0.089   
   2015 Party ID 4 13.156 3.289 35.135 0.000 
    Residuals 2245 210.157 0.094   
Get Ahead ROC Vote 1997 Vote 4 6.515 1.629 16.806 0.000 
    Residuals 1687 163.481 0.097   
   2000 Vote 3 4.393 1.464 15.268 0.000 
    Residuals 933 89.492 0.096   
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   2004 Vote 4 3.598 0.899 8.451 0.000 
    Residuals 1129 120.153 0.106   
   2006 Vote 4 8.383 2.096 22.222 0.000 
    Residuals 2016 190.138 0.094   
   2008 Vote 4 9.505 2.376 25.989 0.000 
    Residuals 2169 198.312 0.091   
   2011 Vote 4 12.953 3.238 36.259 0.000 
    Residuals 1966 175.580 0.089   
   2015 Vote 4 16.913 4.228 46.721 0.000 
    Residuals 2016 182.449 0.091   
Get Ahead ROC Income 1997 Income 2 1.068 0.534 5.473 0.004 
    Residuals 1628 158.812 0.098   
   2000 Income 2 1.453 0.727 7.500 0.001 
    Residuals 1277 123.744 0.097   
   2004 Income 2 0.184 0.092 0.871 0.419 
    Residuals 2454 259.759 0.106   
   2006 Income 2 0.213 0.106 1.097 0.334 
    Residuals 1161 112.514 0.097   
   2008 Income 2 0.136 0.068 0.695 0.499 
    Residuals 1176 115.393 0.098   
   2011 Income 2 1.529 0.764 7.810 0.000 
    Residuals 1540 150.701 0.098   
   2015 Vote 4 16.913 4.228 46.721 0.000 
    Residuals 2016 182.449 0.091   
Get Ahead QC Party ID 1997 Party ID 4 2.788 0.697 6.806 0.000 
    Residuals 705 72.198 0.102   
   2000 Party ID 5 1.754 0.351 3.882 0.002 
    Residuals 845 76.368 0.090   
   2004 Party ID 5 3.435 0.687 7.056 0.000 
    Residuals 608 59.191 0.097   
   2006 Party ID 5 3.132 0.626 6.410 0.000 
    Residuals 750 73.295 0.098   
   2008 Party ID 5 1.797 0.359 3.256 0.007 
    Residuals 568 62.686 0.110   
   2011 Party ID 5 2.686 0.537 5.999 0.000 
    Residuals 856 76.650 0.090   
   2015 Party ID 5 2.559 0.512 5.654 0.000 
    Residuals 488 44.171 0.091   
Get Ahead QC Vote 1997 Vote 4 2.612 0.653 6.518 0.000 
    Residuals 597 59.796 0.100   
   2000 Vote 4 1.154 0.288 3.535 0.007 
    Residuals 612 49.930 0.082   
   2004 Vote 4 0.545 0.136 1.348 0.251 
    Residuals 444 44.865 0.101   
   2006 Vote 5 2.961 0.592 6.119 0.000 
    Residuals 658 63.687 0.097   
   2008 Vote 5 3.965 0.793 7.876 0.000 
    Residuals 641 64.537 0.101   
   2011 Vote 4 1.072 0.268 3.001 0.018 
    Residuals 554 49.469 0.089   
   2015 Vote 5 2.766 0.553 5.969 0.000 
    Residuals 455 42.173 0.093   
Get Ahead QC Income 1997 Income 2 0.436 0.218 1.976 0.140 
    Residuals 575 63.386 0.110   
   2000 Income 2 0.065 0.033 0.364 0.695 
    Residuals 750 67.169 0.090   
   2004 Income 2 0.437 0.219 2.124 0.120 
    Residuals 651 67.007 0.103   
   2006 Income 2 0.254 0.127 1.271 0.282 
    Residuals 347 34.706 0.100   
   2008 Income 2 0.039 0.019 0.169 0.844 
    Residuals 369 42.079 0.114   
   2011 Income 2 0.105 0.052 0.526 0.591 
    Residuals 396 39.463 0.100   
   2015 Vote 5 2.766 0.553 5.969 0.000 
    Residuals 455 42.173 0.093   
 
